What is the law?
The European Works Council (EWC) Directive was transposed into Irish law by the Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act, 1996 (TICEA) (our general guide on which is available here). TICEA provides that, upon receiving a request to set up an EWC, an Irish business has three years to negotiate an EWC agreement with a special negotiating body composed of employees’ representatives from across Europe (SNB).
If an EWC agreement cannot be reached, a set of default provisions, known as the subsidiary requirements, govern the relationship between the business and its EWC. These requirements are found in the Second Schedule to TICEA and include that the member(s) representing Irish employees must be elected in accordance with the First Schedule to TICEA. The only method provided by TICEA for redress against the business in the event of its non-compliance with these requirements is a criminal prosecution against either or both of it and the individuals responsible for its conduct.
However, instead of seeking redress under TICEA, the union engaged the industrial relations remit of the Labour Court by referring the matter pursuant to section 26 (1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1990. Section 26(1) provides for a recommendation to be issued by the Labour Court which is non-binding on the parties.
What happened?
Ryanair received a request to set up an EWC in May 2022. In response, it established a SNB of 16 employees’ representatives from 11 European countries, including two Irish members.
In March 2025, Ryanair recognised that it was unlikely to conclude an EWC agreement with the SNB within the three-year negotiation period. It therefore proposed to the members of the SNB that they agree to serve as the first members of its EWC. The members of the SNB agreed to this proposal.
Whilst such an agreement might be considered a pragmatic approach in all the circumstances, there is no provision in TICEA which sets out a legal basis for an Irish business and a SNB to agree this arrangement. Its conclusion also does not affect an Irish business’s obligation to comply with the subsidiary requirements as soon as possible and in any case within six months, including the obligation for the Irish member(s) of the EWC to be elected in accordance with the First Schedule to TICEA.
How did a dispute arise?
Fórsa is a trade union recognised by Ryanair for collective bargaining purposes. If Ryanair and its SNB failed to conclude an EWC agreement, then Fórsa would have been entitled to nominate candidates to be the Irish members of the EWC (as set out in the First Schedule to TICEA), and to be consulted on the conduct of the election. Fórsa therefore pre-emptively wrote to Ryanair on 14 March 2025 and requested that, if Ryanair and the SNB failed to conclude an EWC agreement, Ryanair either appoint Fórsa’s proposed nominees as the Irish members of the EWC (even though such proposal would have been a breach by Ryanair of its obligation to hold an election) or hold an election for the Irish members. Ryanair rejected both proposals.
The negotiation period ended on 12 May 2025 without an EWC agreement being reached. Following that, Ryanair proceeded on the basis of its agreement with the SNB (i.e. that the EWC would comprise the members of the SNB). A dispute accordingly arose between, on the one hand, Ryanair and, on the other hand, Fórsa and its two proposed nominees. The dispute was the subject of a Conciliation Conference at the Workplace Relations Commission before later being referred to the Labour Court on 29 October 2025 in accordance with section 26(1) of the Industrial Relations Act, 1990.
On 12 November 2025, Ryanair met with its purported “EWC”. It did so notwithstanding there being no legal basis under TICEA for the body’s Irish ‘members’ to be members, given that they had not been elected in accordance with the First Schedule to TICEA.
What did the Labour Court recommend?
The Labour Court held a hearing on 2 December 2025 and issued a non-binding recommendation on 17 December 2025.
The Labour Court noted that no collective agreement existed requiring Ryanair to consult on this issue. Nonetheless, it recommended that, in the interests of good industrial relations, Ryanair should have notified Fórsa in advance of its intention to propose that in the event that an EWC agreement could not be concluded, the members of the SNB would become members of the EWC. It also recommended that, in future, Ryanair should keep Fórsa informed about the election and nomination cycle of the EWC.
Implications for employers
Recommendations under the Industrial Relations Act are non-binding. This is helpful for employers with EWCs under Irish law as it means that this recommendation is not legally binding on them in terms of any claim under TICEA regarding the composition of an SNB or EWC. However, it does highlight some potential issues around the proposals by all parties involved in that:
- Fórsa’s preferred outcome was a recommendation that its proposed nominees be appointed as the Irish members of the EWC, notwithstanding that that would have denied Ryanair’s Irish employees the right to elect their representatives under the First Schedule of TICEA;
- Ryanair met with its purported ‘EWC’ on 12 November 2025 despite there being no basis in TICEA for its approach and a failure to comply with the subsidiary requirements potentially being a criminal offence; and
- the Labour Court appears to have failed to take account of the facts that:
- whilst there might be no obligation on Ryanair to consult with Fórsa under their collective agreement on the composition of the EWC, this should be an irrelevant consideration where an employer is under a statutory obligation to consult its recognised trade union on its Irish election proposals; and
- giving a recommendation on how an employer should seek to agree for members of a SNB to become the members of an EWC operating under the subsidiary requirements was contrary to the provisions of TICEA on the election of the Irish member(s) of an EWC.
It is possible that Ryanair’s approach stemmed from it trying to follow one of the principles of the UK case of Manpower (about which we wrote here). In that case, the UK’s Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the right of a UK business and a SNB to agree for the members of a SNB to become the first members of an EWC operating under a negotiated agreement. However, the critical distinction is that, unlike in the Manpower case, Ryanair failed to conclude an EWC agreement in accordance with the applicable legal framework and this agreement was the essential basis for individuals to lawfully transition from being members of the SNB to being members of the EWC.
All change ahead?
The Labour Court’s recommendation most likely reflects the manner in which this case came before it. As the Labour Court reminded the parties:
“the referral to it was under the Industrial Relations Act… in such a case it is not open to the Court to make findings that the interpretation of, or application of, a different statute is right or wrong. That can only be done in the method provided for by that piece of legislation, which in this case is not an Industrial Relations referral to the Labour Court”.
Whilst the recommendation is silent on their rationale, it appears likely that Fórsa and its proposed nominees sought redress under the Industrial Relations Act because:
- TICEA provides no method for them to bring any form of civil law complaint against Ryanair for failing to comply with the subsidiary requirements; and
- if the option was even considered, referring the dispute for criminal prosecution would have amounted to a significant escalation.
Whilst some commentators have suggested that the Labour Court’s decision in the Verizon case (about which we wrote here) that the WRC and Labour Court have no jurisdiction over disputes that are collective in nature might explain Fórsa’s and its proposed nominees’ approach, that appears unlikely. The statutory provision in question in that case concerns the rights of existing members of an EWC. As Fórsa’s and its proposed nominees’ case was that there are no validly elected Irish members of the EWC, they would have been unable to use the provision in question to seek redress by way of a complaint (as opposed to their request for conciliation) to the Workplace Relations Commission, even if the High Court had overturned the Labour Court’s decision in the Verizon case earlier than 14 November 2025.
Overall, it appears that, unless they choose to escalate this dispute by referring it to the relevant Minister for them to bring a criminal prosecution against Ryanair, Fórsa and its proposed nominees are left without a way to enforce their rights under the First Schedule to TICEA. Whilst problematic for Fórsa and its proposed nominees, this is unsurprising given that Ireland is currently subject to infringement proceedings by the European Commission because of TICEA’s deficiencies. The new European Works Council Directive (about which we wrote here) will significantly strengthen the frameworks for the enforcement of employees’ rights because of those deficiencies.
Whilst the cost that Ryanair might bear for its approach on this occasion is likely to be limited to a worse relationship with Fórsa and its proposed nominees, this case helpfully serves as a timely reminder for businesses of the importance of running their EWC in accordance with TICEA and that the implications of any non-compliance will soon increase significantly.
Read the full recommendation here – Ryanair and 2 Workers (represented by Fórsa).
