The High Court in Reid-Roberts & Anor v Mei-Lin & Anor [2026] EWHC 49 (Ch) recently examined whether WhatsApp messages and emails effected an immediate disposition of a beneficial interest in land, and whether WhatsApp messages can satisfy the particular statutory requirements under section 53(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925. The court held that the exchanges did not effect an immediate disposition and that WhatsApp headers did not amount to a signature for the purposes of section 53(1). Beyond the specific requirements of statute however, the courts have readily acknowledged that WhatsApp messages can easily create binding contractual obligations between parties.

Reid-Roberts in summary

The case concerned an appeal and a cross-appeal to the High Court against a decision of a Deputy Insolvency and Companies Court judge regarding ownership of a London property ("the Property"). The appellants were joint trustees in bankruptcy of the second respondent, Mr Gudmundsson ("the Trustees"). The first respondent, Ms Lin, was formerly married to Mr Gudmundsson, and they owned the Property together. 

The Deputy Judge had found that the Trustees and Ms Lin each held 50% of the beneficial interest in the Property and ordered Ms Lin to deliver up vacant possession of the Property in 2032, after which time, the property could be sold. 

The Trustees challenged the long deferral of sale (which we do not consider in this article). Ms Lin cross‑appealed, arguing that the court was wrong not to find that Mr Gudmundsson had, via a pre‑bankruptcy WhatsApp and email exchange in 2018, already transferred the whole beneficial interest of the Property to her. This transfer would mean the Property was no longer part of his estate, meaning that the Trustees had no claim to it. 

The December 2018 communications relied on as a disposition

Ms Lin alleged that WhatsApp messages on 2 – 3 December 2018, and follow‑up emails on 3 December 2018, effected an immediate transfer of Mr Gudmundsson's beneficial interest in the Property to her. 

In the WhatsApp messages, Mr Gudmundsson proposed giving Ms Lin "100%" responsibility for their children and said he could "sign over" his share of the Property, aiming to "close the financial part of the divorce this week." Ms Lin replied that she would "take house and full custody of kids". In emails she said, "I will have full custody of kids and take the house" and stated, "This week we shall finish the paperwork." Mr Gudmundsson wrote back: "For avoidance of doubt this is not agreed." He later stated: "Why don't you just keep the house in London and the kids move with me to Iceland." 

Issues on the cross‑appeal

The core questions were: (1) did the December 2018 communications include a disposition by Mr Gudmundsson; and if so, (2) did the messages satisfy section 53(1)(a) and/or (c) of the Law of Property Act 1925 requiring a disposition to be in "writing signed by the person" making it?

The Deputy Judge below thought the WhatsApp and email messages both demonstrated a clear intention by Mr Gudmundsson "to release" his share. He found that the fact that Mr Gudmundsson had finished his emails "All the best, Audun Mar Gudmundsson" satisfied section 53(1). In contrast, the WhatsApp messages did not conclude with Mr Gudmundsson's name. Nonetheless, the Deputy Judge found that section 53(1) was still satisfied as his name was in the "header to the messages".

However, the Deputy Judge noted that the Court of Appeal decision in Xydhias v Xydhias [1999] 1 All ER 386 provides that "binding authority to the effect that whilst the parties to the divorce proceedings can engage in negotiations to resolve issues, any agreement they reach will have to be approved by the judge having the conduct of the matter. It will then be recorded in the appropriate Court order." Accordingly, he concluded that there was no disposition and that Mr Gudmundsson's beneficial interest duly vested in the Trustees. 

The court's analysis: no immediate disposition on the facts

On appeal, the parties accepted that Xydhias does not bar an immediate disposition; Soulsbury v Soulsbury [2008] Fam 1 requires a distinction between an immediate disposition of an interest in property and an agreement to dispose in future (the latter of which could be "caught" by Xydhias). The court therefore went on to consider issues raised by the Trustees. They argued that any finding that there had been an immediate disposition was wrong and, in any event, the requirements of section 53(1) were not satisfied.

The judge first considered whether there had been an immediate disposition, distinguishing Hudson v Hathway [2023] KB 345 where emails saying "Take it" and disavowing any interest showed immediate intent to release a beneficial interest (rather than a promise to do so in the future). He held the present context – live divorce proceedings with solicitors instructed, the informality of WhatsApp, and the language used – pointed against an immediate and unequivocal divestment. The messages referred to "sign[ing] over" and "clos[ing] the financial part of the divorce," and Ms Lin spoke of "finish[ing] the paperwork" and telling lawyers what had been agreed, which suggested steps to come as part of an overall divorce settlement, rather than a completed disposition. Further, when Ms Lin purported to accept what had been proposed, Mr Gudmundsson promptly denied any agreement and proposed different terms. Unlike in Hudson, there was no subsequent disavowal of interest.

The judge also noted earlier in the judgment that the communications were plainly not regarded at the time as having settled matters and noted that financial remedy proceedings in the parties' divorce were contested. 

The court therefore found that there had been no immediate disposition of the Property and that Mr Gudmundsson's beneficial interest vested in the Trustees (albeit for different reasons to the Deputy Judge). 

The signature point: WhatsApp headers don't satisfy section 53(1)

Although not strictly necessary given his finding above, the appeal court then addressed whether WhatsApp messages can satisfy the requirements of section 53(1). The judge noted that section 53(1) can be satisfied by multiple documents, and it was accepted that WhatsApp messages can be "writing." 

The Trustees accepted a WhatsApp could be "signed" if the sender's name appears in the message body to authenticate it, akin to an email sign‑off. However, they disputed that a WhatsApp chat header displaying the sender's name at the top of the thread could operate as a signature for the purpose of section 53(1). 

The judge reviewed authorities on what counts as a "signature," focusing on whether a name is applied to the document with authenticating intent and connected to the whole instrument.

The judge agreed with the Trustees, holding the WhatsApp header is analogous to an email address automatically inserted by a service provider to the top of an email (following J Pereira Fernandes SA v Mehta [2006] 1 WLR 1543). The judge did not consider the WhatsApp header to be part of the message itself, but only a mechanism designed by the relevant service provider to identify the sender. It is therefore incidental to the message itself and lacks authorising intent tied to the contents. Additionally, Mr Gudmundsson did not cause the heading to appear by sending the relevant messages – rather the heading was already there in the app, as it appeared on Ms Lin's phone. 

The cross-appeal was dismissed. 

WhatsApps and contracts

Leaving specific statutory requirements aside, it is relatively easy for parties to enter into legally binding agreements, even by "informal" means, provided the necessary components of contract formation are present (as to which, see page 11 of our Contact Interpretation Guide). The courts have considered the use of WhatsApp communications in recent cases to determine whether binding obligations have been created using this medium and such questions are arising more often due to the prevalence of quick and easy communication methods. 

For example:

Southeastern Maritime Ltd v Trafigura Maritime Logistics Pte Ltd [2024] EWHC 255 (Comm) – the High Court acknowledged that WhatsApp communications were used to convey important and relevant contractual information and should not be disregarded or treated with less significance because messages were sent by WhatsApp rather than email. 

Jaevee Homes Ltd v Fincham [2025] EWHC 942 (TCC) – the High Court concluded that an exchange of WhatsApp messages between businesses in the construction sector, "whilst informal, evidenced and constituted a concluded contract". Our detailed analysis of this case can be found here.

DAZN Ltd v Coupang Corp [2025] EWCA Civ 1083 – the Court of Appeal found that a contract relating to broadcasting rights was concluded through a combination of informal WhatsApp and email communications. The court found nothing to suggest that the parties intended that the drafting of a formal contract was a necessary prerequisite to being legally bound by the agreed terms. In fact, there were a number of indications to the contrary and the court noted that an informal process of agreement, with a long-form contract to follow, was common in the industry. 

Variations to existing obligations

These cases are interesting when it comes to considering variations to existing contracts. 

Existing contracts will commonly have provisions governing how variations are to be concluded. This is intended to avoid informal or ad hoc changes and promote certainty. For example, variations must be in writing (so no oral modifications) and signed by both parties or there may be a formal change control process. 

An exchange of emails might satisfy requirements for a variation to be in writing and signed. An exchange of WhatsApp messages may not: a formal signature requirement might be said not to be met if a party's name does not appear in the body of the message. The obiter aspects of the appeal court here may lend support to this position. However, arguments of estoppel and reliance may well arise on the facts which could prevent a party from rowing back from their own messages – analysis of the specific circumstances will be needed. 

Practical takeaways 

• Informality and ongoing negotiation will undermine any claim that messages effected an immediate release or disposition of a beneficial interest in property; context and language will be read closely.
• A WhatsApp chat header isn't a "signature" for the purpose of section 53(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925; parties relying on electronic communications should ensure the disposer's name is applied within the body of the message itself with clear authenticating intent.
• A contract does not need to be in any specific form. Legally binding agreements can be entered into relatively easily, including by WhatsApp message, provided the essential elements of contract formation are present. The circumstances of each case, including the content and context of the messages, will be key.
• Should you wish to avoid informal communications becoming legally binding, make this expressly clear in those communications and use the label "Subject to contract".
• Specify in contracts how communications are to be undertaken (for example, giving notice under a contract) and ensure variation provisions governing the manner in which changes can be made are sufficiently robust and formal.
• Educate business personnel on the manner in which they should communicate and the ease of entering into legally binding agreements or variations.
• In appropriate circumstances, ensure less "formal" means of communications (including WhatsApp messages) are archived and stored alongside other more traditional business communications.

If you are in doubt as to the legal effect of communications, our Dispute Resolution team can advise. Contact Mark Lim for more information.